Alabama Supreme Court Hears Oral Argument in Mac Marquette Pretrial Immunity Case
The Alabama Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments on Mac Marquette’s petition for a writ of mandamus, seeking review of the denial of pretrial immunity in an officer-involved shooting. Although multiple attorneys appear on behalf of Marquette in the record, oral argument was presented by J.D. Lloyd of Birmingham.
The initial focus of the Court’s questioning centered on the applicable statutory framework governing police immunity and self-defense. Lloyd emphasized that Alabama’s more recent “Back the Blue” legislation does not apply retroactively and that the case is governed by the earlier statutory scheme. Much of the early argument involved determining which Code sections controlled the analysis.
The State advanced the position that the testimony of the other officers involved should be viewed “with a grain of salt,” suggesting their recollections lacked credibility. More notably, the State argued that Marquette—despite being on duty, in uniform, and acting pursuant to an assignment from the City of Decatur—was not acting as a law enforcement officer at the time of the shooting. According to the State, because Marquette was present during a vehicle repossession, he was trespassing on Steven Perkins’s property.
Justice Shaw directly addressed the State’s reliance on § 7A-9-609, Ala. Code, which governs secured parties’ rights following default. After reviewing the statute’s text, Justice Shaw noted that the provision applies to secured parties—not law enforcement—and does not expressly prohibit police involvement in repossessions. The State nevertheless maintained that the statute implicitly barred police assistance. Justice Shaw disagreed, observing that the black-letter law contains no such prohibition.
Justice Mendheim questioned the State’s trespass theory, pointing out that the record reflected that the repossession driver—not the police—had been told not to return to the property. Justice Mendheim further echoed Justice Shaw’s statutory interpretation and reframed the issue as one potentially sounding in negligence rather than criminal liability. The State continued to argue that Marquette was not acting within his law enforcement role and had not demonstrated a clear legal right to immunity.
Justice Cook appeared more receptive to the State’s position, expressing difficulty with the trespass issue and suggesting that officers could have knocked and announced their presence. That line of questioning raised concerns often cautioned against in Graham v. Connor—evaluating use-of-force decisions through hindsight rather than from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene.
Lloyd closed by responding to Justice Shaw’s inquiry regarding the role of body-camera footage in assessing whether the use of force was reasonable and, if so, whether Marquette was entitled to immunity.
Legal Analysis
The State’s argument that Marquette was not acting as a law enforcement officer is unsupported by both the facts and the law. There is little room for serious debate on that point.
Likewise, the trespass theory fails under Alabama law. Under § 13A-7-4, Ala. Code, criminal trespass in the third degree requires that a person knowingly enter or remain unlawfully on the premises of another. A person who reasonably and honestly believes they are privileged to be present is not guilty of trespass. The record contains no evidence that Marquette knew—or believed—his presence was unlawful. Accordingly, he cannot be classified as a trespasser under the statute.
Justice Shaw’s interpretation of § 7A-9-609 is also correct. That provision governs secured parties reclaiming collateral after default. It does not, by its plain language, prohibit police presence during a repossession. While police involvement may raise policy or best-practice concerns for municipalities, the statute itself does not criminalize or forbid such assistance.
With trespass and statutory misapplication removed from the analysis, the case turns on self-defense. Lloyd correctly argued that § 13A-3-27 does not foreclose application of § 13A-3-23. Section 13A-3-27 permits officers to use force within their discretionary authority so long as it is not excessive, while § 13A-3-23 authorizes force—up to and including deadly force—when reasonably necessary to defend oneself or a third person from the imminent use of unlawful deadly physical force.
During argument, Justice Bryan suggested that Mr. Perkins may have been entitled to use deadly force to defend his property. That position is inconsistent with longstanding Alabama law. Deadly force cannot be used solely to protect property—a principle well established through both statute and common law.
The dispositive question is therefore narrow: did Officer Marquette reasonably believe that Steven Perkins was about to use unlawful deadly physical force?
The record reflects that the repossession driver requested police assistance after being threatened with a firearm during an earlier attempt. Body-camera footage further shows Perkins emerging from the residence armed and pointing a firearm toward the driver. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to conclude that Marquette’s belief that deadly force was imminent was unreasonable—particularly given that deadly force would not have been legally justified to protect property alone.
Conclusion
Applying Alabama law as written, police are not expressly prohibited from assisting in repossessions under § 7A-9-609, and Marquette was not a trespasser under § 13A-7-4. The remaining inquiry—self-defense—favors immunity under the facts presented.
In my view, the proper outcome is clear: Marquette is entitled to pretrial immunity, and the indictment should be dismissed. Whether the Alabama Supreme Court agrees remains to be seen.
Hayden Glass Sizemore 